The People vs the God of Big Dams
by Arundhati Roy
On
the morning of the 18th of October the three judge bench of the
Supreme Court delivered its verdict on the PIL filed by the Narmada
Bachao Andolan against the Union of India and the state governments
of Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. After six-and-a-half
years of litigation, the primary imperative of what has come to
be called `the majority judgment' by Chief Justice Anand and Justice
Kirpal is that the construction of the (currently 88 metre high)
Sardar Sarovar Dam be completed as `expeditiously' as possible.
Further, it says that the court ought to have no role in deciding
such matters. (Ought it to take a six year legal injunction and
three Supreme Court judges to come to this profound conclusion?)
Justice Bharucha, the only one of the three judges on the Bench
to have heard the case through from the time it was filed, wrote
a dissenting judgment, detailing the reasons why he could not bring
himself to agree with his brother judges.
In an earlier
essay on the Narmada valley, The Greater Common Good, (for which
I was rapped on the knuckles by the Supreme Court), I described
how successfully the Indian State has used all the institutions
at its command - the army, the police, the bureaucracy, the courts
- to achieve what it set out to achieve. To appropriate India's
resources - including its land, its forests, its rivers - and redistribute
them to a favoured few. The Indian State is superbly accomplished
in the art of protecting the cadres of its paid-up elite and pulverising
those who inconvenience its intentions. Its finest feat of all is
the way it achieves all this and emerges smelling sweet. (After
all, we're not Burma, or Indonesia, or Rwanda or even Pakistan.
We're the proud citizens of the world's biggest democracy.) If you
want a quick fix on how the smell is sweetened, a sort of Lazy Person's
Guide to The Way India Works, read the two Supreme Court judgments
side by side. Had Justice Bharucha chosen not to place his dissent
on record, we would never have known the unimaginable process by
which the Sardar Sarovar project insinuated itself into the world.
For this, I doff my cap to Mr Bharucha. Thank you sir.
In 1961 Nehru
laid the foundation stone for a 49.8 metre high dam - the midget
progenitor of the Sardar Sarovar. In 1979, after the Narmada Water
Disputes Tribunal announced its award, the Sardar Sarovar was redesigned
to be a massive, 138.68 metre high dam, which, though located in
Gujarat, would submerge villages in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra.
In 1985, before
any detailed studies had been done, before any costs were computed,
before anybody had any idea what the human cost or environmental
impact of the dam would be, even before the Union ministry of environment
cleared the project, the World Bank sanctioned a 450 million dollar
loan. (Eight years later, in March 1993, after commissioning an
Independent Review, which said that the project was inherently flawed
and that rehabilitation would be impossible, the World Bank withdrew
from the project. This does not absolve it from the sin of setting
the ball in play.)
As soon as
the World Bank load was in place, the state governments set up an
unseemly clamouring for the project to be approved by the Ministry
of Environment and Forests regardless of the fact that no proper
studies had been done. In his judgment, Justice Bharucha documents
this process in detail, quoting note after incriminating note.
In October
1986, a Note was prepared by the Ministry of Water Resources on
the environmental aspects of the Sardar Sarovar project. It said
that the clearance of the projects from the environmental angle
and under the Forest Conservation Act 1980 had become a matter of
urgency for the governments of Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh (that
luscious loan was waiting). The Ministry of Environment and Forests
said that it was doing its best ``but have been finding the material
submitted inadequate and unsatisfactory.'' Under a sub-heading ``Should
the project be taken up at all?'', the Note said that abandoning
the project was not advisable even though critical information (which
would take at least three years to collect) was not available. There
is a remarkable, Kafkaesque section in the Note: ``with the project
postponed for three years and with no assurance at the end of that
period that the decision will be positive, it is difficult to believe
that all these studies, surveys and plans relating to the environmental
aspects will be pursued with energy and enthusiasm and the necessary
resources devoted to them. In other words, the postponement of the
decision in the interest of collecting information...may in fact
prove to be a self defeating exercise.''
In other words,
the government sees no point in doing studies unless it already
knows the outcome will be favourable to the project. (And, axiomatically,
if it already knows the outcome, why bother with the studies?)
On November
20, 1986, another Note was prepared by the Ministry of Water Resources
and forwarded to the Additional Secretary to the Prime Minister.
Considering the fact that basic data on vital aspects of the project
was still not available the Note says ``there could be but one conclusion,
that the project(s) are not ready for approval.'' Yet on January
15, 1987 a note was put up to the Prime Minister by his Secretary,
seeking his approval for conditional joint clearance of the Sardar
Sarovar and Narmada Sagar projects. The Department of Environment
and Forests said that the rehabilitation plan was not ready, that
land had not been surveyed, that areas of land use capability and
water availability had not been identified and the land being suggested
for rehabilitation, prima facie appeared to be infertile. The PM's
Secretary, however, said that the project had been waiting for clearance
for over seven years (what were they doing all that time?) and that
the chief ministers of MP and Gujarat were ``keenly awaiting'' it.
On January 19, 1987 the Prime Minister (Rajiv Gandhi) jotted a hand-written
comment on the note: ``Perhaps this is a good time to try for a
River Valley Authority, discuss.''
This is the
only thing on record that constitutes the `Prime Minister's clearance'.
This single throwaway sentence is then used to announce to the press
that the projects have been cleared. The file is judiciously fattened
with various notes and letters from the state governments hailing
the clearance.
On June 24,
1987, based on what the Ministry itself called inadequate information,
the Ministry of Environment and Forests gave a clearance to the
projects subject to several conditions including a Catchment Area
Treatment Scheme, Command Area Development Plan and the submission
of a Rehabilitation Master Plan. In his dissenting `minority' judgment,
Justice Bharucha says ``An environment clearance based on next to
no data in regard to the environmental impact of the project was
contrary to the terms of the then policy of the Union of India in
regard to environmental clearances and, therefore, no clearance
at all.'' His judgment goes on to say that it was mandatory under
the conditions of clearance that catchment area treatment and the
full rehabilitation of all displaced people be completed before
any water is impounded in the reservoir. According to Justice Bharucha,
the fact that this has not happened constitutes a clear violation
of the conditions of clearance. He says that in the 13 years that
have passed since the conditional clearance, no comprehensive environmental
impact assessment has been done. For all these reasons the dissenting
judgment says that the project must be sent back to the Ministry
of Environment for fresh clearance after proper studies have been
done.
The `majority
judgment' however, sweeps this aside calling environmental clearance
``only an administrative requirement.'' Only an administrative requirement?
Environmental clearance for two dams whose reservoirs will, between
them, hold more water than any other reservoir in the Indian subcontinent
is only an administrative requirement? What sort of precedent does
this set for the planners of the 695 big dams that are being planned
and constructed in India right now? Should they throw darts at a
map where they want to build a dam and then go ahead and build it?
Will the Supreme Court support them pari pasu?
The `majority
judgment' actually goes on to blame the NBA for filing the petition
so late. ``For any project which is approved after due deliberation
(notice how in the course of 13 years a Prime Minister's casual
one-liner becomes `due deliberation') the Court should refrain from
being asked to review the decision...Pleas relating to height of
the dam and the extent of submergence, environment studies and clearance,
hydrology, seismicity and other issues except implementation of
relief and rehabilitation, cannot be raised at this belated stage.''
What this means
is that the government sees no point in doing studies before the
project starts, and that citizens have no right to question it once
construction begins. The message from the highest court in the land
is pretty clear: Poor? Adivasi? Dalit? Happen to live in the submergence
zone of a big dam? Tough luck. Go away, and go quietly.
The `majority
judgment' decrees that the project should be completed according
to the guidelines of the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award under
the supervision of the Narmada Control Authority (NCA), supposedly
an independent authority. The Chairman of the NCA Review Committee
is the Minister of Water Resources. The Chairman of the NCA itself
is Secretary, Ministry of Water Resources. (Round and round the
apple tree. Little partner dance with me...) Never mind that for
13 years the NCA has consistently violated the Award of the Tribunal,
which is what led to the filing of the petition in the first place.
Despite this shocking record, their lordships see no reason to ``assume
that the authorities will not function properly.'' In October 2000,
13 years after the so-called ``environmental clearance'' and commencement
of construction, the court asks the NCA to produce within four weeks
a Rehabilitation Master Plan which they haven't managed to produce
in 13 years. Mind you, we're still talking of a plan --not of actual
rehabilitation.
In 1979, the
number of families that were to be `officially' displaced by the
SSP was 6,000. In 1987, it was 12,000. In 1991, it surged to 27,000.
In 1994, when the petition was filed it was 41,500. That's more
than 200,000 people. Today God knows what the real figure is. The
court has it on affidavit from the government of Madhya Pradesh
(the state to which 80 per cent of the displaced people belong)
that it has no land for rehabilitation. In the last 13 years, since
construction began, MP has not provided a single hectare of agricultural
land for rehabilitation. What's more, the governments of MP and
Maharashtra have said under oath on legal affidavits that 368 families
who have been displaced by the present height of the dam (88 metres)
have not been given land. (Of course the MP government doesn't mention
the 114,000 oustees from the Bargi Dam and the 30,000 oustees from
the Maheshwar Dam and the indeterminate number of oustees from all
the other dams it has planned, who have also not been given land)..
And yet, the Supreme Court of India clears the immediate raising
of the dam height up to 90 metres.
In other words,
it orders the violation of the Tribunal Award. For the BJP government
in Gujarat this comes as a life-raft. Having suffered a severe setback
in the local panchayat elections, the judgment couldn't have been
better-timed for the Gujarat government had drafted it itself. The
perfect Diwali gift for a perfect government. Honestly, some people
have all the luck.
After having
repeatedly prevented the NBA from making any submissions in court
on the merits and demerits of Big Dams, the last few pages of the
`majority' judgment launch into a badly written eulogy to big dams
based on no evidence whatsoever. Two quotes, two points:
(a) The petitioner
has not been able to point out a single instance where construction
of a large dam has, on the whole had an adverse environmental impact.
On the contrary the environment has improved.
Maybe their
lordships don't travel very much. They could go to Punjab and have
a water-logged weekend in the command area of the famous Bhakra
Nangal Dam. Or stay at home and read the study of 300 projects by
the Expert Committee on River Valley projects which found that 89
per cent of them violated the guidelines laid down by the Ministry
of Environment. Or just keep in mind that despite India's 3,600
Big Dams, drought-prone and flood-prone areas have actually increased
since 1947, that 200 million Indian citizens have no access to safe
drinking water, that not a single river in the plains has potable
water, and that 10 million hectares of irrigated agricultural land
are currently saline and water-logged.
(b) At the
time of Independence foodgrain was being imported to India but with
the passage of time and the construction of more dams the position
has been reversed. The large-scale river valley projects per se
all over the country have made India more than self-sufficient in
food.
I thought so
too, your lordships. Until I began to look for some official, government
facts to back that thesis up and found that there weren't any. Until
now no studies have been done to determine what percentage of India's
foodgrain is produced by big dams. To believe that Big Dams are
the key to India's food security is to have faith without facts
because facts don't exist. At least they didn't until recently.
This year, a chapter in the India Country Study done for the World
Commission on Dams (whose report will be released in London by Nelson
Mandela on November 16) says that 10 per cent of India's foodgrain
is produced by big dams. That's 20 million tonnes. The Ministry
of Food and Civil Supplies says that 10 per cent of India's foodgrain
is eaten every year by rats. And that's 20 million tonnes. We must
be the only country in the world that builds dams, uproots millions
of people (56 million people in the last 50 years according to the
India Country Study), submerges forests and destroys the environment
in order to feed rats. Clearly we need better warehouses more than
we need Big Dams.
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